Pascals Wager and the Fear of God
In 1669, mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal wrote a short essay discussing the influential “wager” he proposed as proof of Gods existence. This essay, now known as Pascals Wager, suggests that rational people should at least “act” as though God exists, since the potential reward is exponential if God does actually exist. Martinich and Goetz suggest the only way to “believe” in God without being bias is to simply accept Pascals wager as rational explanation. Miller claims that Pascal’s Wager could be considered a logical fallacy, asserting that his argument is pointless because one cannot will themselves to “believe” in God, therefore belief would require “evidence” first. The purpose of this paper is to argue that although false reasoning can present a compelling argument, Pascal’s Wager instils fear and presents potential both potential physical and spiritual confidence without logical proof.
In Pascals wager he implies that if one gambles on the existence of God, the potential reward of eternal life suppresses the potential worth of material rewards being offered in exchange for an act of faith. Pascal reasons that it is “all or nothing” and that if one believes there is a God, and in the afterlife, then it is worthwhile taking a risk. He equates his wager to the game of cards, suggesting that the reward for a correct guess are much higher than the risk of a wrong guess. Critic Johann von Goethe states “The fearful uncertainty of not knowing has more power to move me than the probability of obtaining either, since there is something in the fear of an unmeasurable doom that is much above finite human nature.”[b/]
The suggestion of Pascals works implies that if one fails to come to a logical conclusion, which is to risk ones life with a belief in a “greater being, then the result is an eternity of suffering in hell. Martinich states that Pascal’s wager contains an element of “tacit fear, of satisfying the external “pressure of fear that is inherent to religious belief. There is an element of escape present in Pascals writings, whereby the infinite and unmeasurable doom can be avoided by a simple decision to believe in a deity. This is largely contributed to by the powerful overwhelming fear of God, which Pascal believes allows a decision to be made for the gamble, though posed as rational, is in some ways emotion-based and inherently linked to the emotion of fear. The result is an intense “terror”, as one recognises the potential doom and embraces the idea of wagering in an attempt to escape it.
Miller suggests that rational people believe upon fact and logical proof, and pose questions on the power of will and implication of Pascals suggestion that one can will themselves to believe in a “greater being”. However, the idea of a deity is a difficult concept to comprehend and rationalise. Pascal presents his wager to encourage a “leap of faith” into a belief and avoidance of a conscious disbelief in God. The suggestion of this is that faith in itself is a leap and a risk. By offering absolute trust and hope in something “greater”, one allows for the ability to be rid of the “terror” of the unknown. Though this is not rational evidence it provides a psychological confirmation which, Pascal believes, results in true faith.
Pascals wager proposes a rational explanation for the belief in a deity, but his argument is inherently biased and employs the emotion of fear to encourage faith in something with no physical or logical proof. Pascal’s wager fails to take into account the many different religions in the world and could be argued to be using fear as a tactic to encourage a leap of faith. Though some may feel empowered by the potential reward of being “saved”, Pascals wager instils fear without logical proof, and as such should be disregarded by rational people.
